Our rebuttal: Simply put, the VCEA mandates that Virginia reach a carbon-free power grid by 2050, and RGGI is the most cost-effective way to meet that goal. If the Air Board removed the state from RGGI, Virginia would still be beholden to its VCEA targets. RGGI is a market-based program that gives states flexibility to determine the best way to use proceeds to benefit their residents and gives utilities the flexibility to find the most cost-effective ways to meet emissions limits. Virginia is also already benefiting from the proceeds from the program: the state is projected to receive over $370 million in the first two years of participating in RGGI.

Our rebuttal: While true, this data does not suggest that Virginia can afford to leave RGGI. Much of those emissions reductions were accomplished by reducing Virginia’s reliance on coal for electricity and replacing coal with natural gas. However, most of those gains in emissions reductions have been achieved by this point; Virginia has only a handful of coal plants left in operation, and they run at limited capacity. So while progress was made from 2010 to 2020 in reducing emission rates per MWh, the fuel-switching that drove those reductions cannot deliver many more reductions. Instead, a program like RGGI is necessary to continue that progress in reducing emissions and accelerate it by encouraging more clean electricity.

Our rebuttal: First, one of the grant programs that RGGI funds is an energy efficiency program that helps reduce energy costs, especially for LMI residents. VCN has a breakdown here that illustrates the critical role RGGI plays in reducing costs for Virginians through efficiency and weatherization improvements. While Youngkin likes to emphasize that RGGI adds an additional few dollars to the average Virginian’s monthly electric bill, the average Virginia family could save nearly $1,000 in electricity costs by making weatherization improvements. As VCN points out, RGGI funding is essential to make this weatherization possible, especially for LMI families.
Additionally, if the concern with RGGI is that costs are passed on to consumers, Virginia doesn’t need to necessarily scrap the entire program. As noted in this Mercury article, Virginia originally designed its RGGI participation program as a “consignment auction” where some auction proceeds would be redistributed to ratepayers to reduce cost impacts. This is how Maryland and three other states handle their participation in RGGI. Virginia could shift to this style of participation in RGGI, still reap the benefits of reducing carbon emissions, and direct funding back to ratepayers instead of to grant programs.

Our rebuttal: First, if Youngkin (and Dominion) are concerned about high emissions allowance prices, and the impact those prices could have if they are passed on to ratepayers, the obvious solution is to procure more electricity from clean energy sources and avoid the allowance costs.
Second, Dominion includes the costs associated with RGGI participation when it bids to supply power to the PJM grid. This means that the additional RGGI costs cause pollution-emitting sources to be dispatched less for power generation.
Additionally, as stated earlier, if the problem Youngkin wants to raise with RGGI is that costs are passed on to ratepayers, the solution isn’t to scrap the program, but to examine whether a “consignment auction” would better meet the states’ goals to reduce impacts on Virginia residents than the efficiency and resilience grant programs the RGGI funding currently goes to.